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S INCE the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in Texas in
1966,' the courts have gradually become more familiar with and more
sophisticated in their treatment of this complex body of commercial law.2
The cases reported during the current survey period are no exception to
this general observation and, along with a number of the expected, routine
commercial problems, several difficult and well-handled commercial law
cases have been decided. Of particular note during the last year are those
cases that involve the interaction of the Code with other bodies of law,
including tort law, 3 the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Pro-
tection Act (DTPA),4 and statutory lien creditor remedies. 5
While there was no state legislation during the last year, enactment of
the Federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 19806 will have a rapid and significant impact on the banking and
secured transactions aspects of the commercial law field. Some particular
features of this legislation are discussed later in this Article. 7 There were a
few publications during the survey period that might be of interest to those
working in the commercial law area, and these have been collected in the
accompanying footnote. 8 As has become traditional with the Commercial
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code first became effective in Texas on July I, 1966.
1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 721, §§ 1-101-10--105, at 1-316. In 1967 it became part of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 785, §§ 1-6, at 2343-2782.
As amended, the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code now conforms closely to
the 1972 official text. In this Article all references are to the Uniform Commercial Code as
enacted in chapters one through eleven of the Texas Business and Commerce Code [herein-
after referred to as the Code]. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1980-1981).
2. This same point was previously noted in Winship, Commercial Transactions, Annual
Surve of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 203 (1979).V3. See text accompanying notes 42-59 infra.
4. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see text ac-
companying notes 232-45 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 269-78 pnfra.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 101-902, 94 Stat. 132-93 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 12, 15, 22 U.S.C.).
7. See text accompanying notes 246-57 infra.
8. B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE (1980); Bankruptcy Reporter (West 1980) (a specialized reporter collecting cases
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). The publication of a textual treatment on Texas
commercial law is planned for 1981 by the State Bar of Texas under the title CREDITORS'
RIGHTS IN TEXAS (2d ed.). The Texas Association of Bank Counsel now has available a
series of continuing legal education materials and newsletters for members.
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Transactions portion of the Annual Survey, the case discussion that follows
has been organized generally to reflect the topical order of the Code.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
(CHAPTER 1)
A. Choice of Law
Choice of Law by Agreement. In Walker v. Associates Financial Services
Corp. 9 a Texas resident borrowed money by mail from an Indiana lender.
The only office of the lender was located in that jurisdiction. The loan
documents specified that the transaction was to be governed by Indiana
law, and there was no claim of fraud or subterfuge about the choice of law
specified in the note and loan agreement. After default, the borrower sued
the loan company, contending that the transaction violated the Texas in-
stallment loan statutes' 0 and the Texas DTPA.II The trial court noted that
Indiana law was applicable to the case and that no violation of Indiana
law had occurred. 12 On appeal the court held that under both pre-Code
Texas contract law and under section 1.105(a) of the Code,13 the parties to
a transaction that had a reasonable relationship to more than one state
could agree on a choice of law to govern the transaction. 14 Because the
choice had been fairly made without fraud, and because there was no vio-
lation of Indiana law, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 15
This case is consistent with prior applications of the general choice of law
rules of section 1.105 in Texas' 6 and elsewhere. 17
B. Security Interest or Lease
Security or Lease as a Question of Fact. A recurrent question in the law of
commercial transactions has been whether an agreement that purports to
be a lease is actually intended for security under section 1.201(37) of the
Code.' 8 In Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v. Berry 19 the Austin court of civil
appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that an alleged lease was
9. 588 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, §§ 4.01-.04, at 627-32. The current version, not appli-
cable to this dispute, is TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-4.01-.04 (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
II. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
12. 588 S.W.2d at 418.
13. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
14. 588 S.W.2d at 417-18.
15. Id. at 418.
16. Hi Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
17. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Taylor, 225 Kan. 58, 587 P.2d 870 (1978)
(applying New York law to a transaction involving a New York creditor and a Kansas
debtor); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tamerius, 200 Neb. 807, 265 N.W.2d 847 (1978)
(applying Texas law to a transaction involving a Texas lender and a Nebraska borrower).
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(37) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
The numerous cases are conveniently collected in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: CASE
DIGEST 1201.37(7) (Callaghan 1978 & Supp. 1980).
19. 601 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
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actually intended for security, and that a failure to file a financing state-
ment left the secured party with an unperfected security interest that was
subordinate to the competing claim of a judgment lien creditor.20 The fol-
lowing quotation from the opinion is a good summary of current Texas
law on the "security or lease" question:
Should the lease provide that upon compliance with its terms the
lessee becomes owner of the property by the payment of a "nominal"
consideration, the determination whether the lease was one intended
for security is usually a question of fact ...
* * , [T]wo "tests" [have been] employed by courts to determine
whether consideration paid to exercise the option is "nominal."
Those "tests" require one to:
(1) compare the consideration with the market value of the equip-
ment at the time the option is to be exercised; or
(2) ascertain whether the terms of the option are such so as to
leave the lessee with no sensible alternative but to exercise the
option. 2'
Under both tests, the court believed that the lease was one intended for
security.22
One last point to be emphasized about Federal Sign & Signal is that the
secured party should have taken advantage of section 9.408,23 which al-
lows a permissive filing of a financing statement covering leased goods.
Such a filing would have operated to perfect the security interest when the
court made its determination that the transaction was really a security de-
vice and not a lease.
C. Accord and Satisfaction
Accord and Satisfaction by Acceptance of a Check. Transaction planning is
an important part of commercial law, as Federal Sign & Signal demon-
strates. Roylex, Inc. v. S & B Engineers, Inc. 24 stands for the same proposi-
20. Id. at 139-40.
21. Id. at 140. The tests described by the court are set forth in Tackett v. Mid-Conti-
nent Refrigerator Co., 579 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
and Davis Bros. v. Misco Leasing, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no
writ). In Brokers Leasing Corp. v. Standard Pipeline Coating Co., 602 S.W.2d 278, 281
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court utilized the first test quoted in
Federal Sign & Signal to determine that a lease was a true lease and not a conditional sales
contract under § 1.201(37).
22. 601 S.W.2d at 140.
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The
section provides:
A consignor or lessor of goods may file a financing statement using the
terms "consignor," "consignee," "lessor," ".lessee" or the like instead of the
terms specified in Section 9.402. The provisions of this subchapter shall apply
as appropriate to such a financing statement but its filing shall not of itself be a
factor in determining whether or not the consignment or lease is intended as
security (Section 1.201(37)). However, if it is determined for other reasons
that the consignment or lease is so intended, a security interest of the con-
signor or lessor which attaches to the consigned or lease goods is perfected by
such filing.
24. 592 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
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tion but arises in a different form and thus should briefly be noted because
the decision in that case could be mischievous. In Roylex a debtor ten-
dered a check to a creditor in payment of a disputed sum. The check was
clearly marked as being in full payment of the disputed debt. The creditor
did not indorse the check but exchanged it for a cashier's check. The pro-
ceeds of the cashier's check were then deposited in the creditor's bank ac-
count. In a suit by the creditor to recover a further amount on the disputed
debt, the debtor raised an accord and satisfaction as a defense based upon
the previously accepted check. Relying on pre-Code law, the court held
that the accord and satisfaction was effective.25 The potentially mischie-
vous part of the opinion is the court's statement that "[w]hen Roylex re-
ceived this check it was given the choice, either to accept the check as full
payment of the debt, or to return same, unaccepted, and sue S & B for its
full claim."'26 In light of section 1.207,27 which allows an assent to per-
formance with an explicit reservation of rights, the language of the court is
far too broad and ignores a third choice that Roylex could have exercised,
i e., acceptance of the check under protest. This third choice that the Code
affords may be a valuable option to others who find themselves in the posi-
tion of Roylex. The matter has not yet been litigated in Texas, but collat-
eral reading is cited below for further information regarding the means by
which this third choice might be exercised.28
II. SALES TRANSACTIONS
(CHAPTER 2)
A. Formation of Sales Contracts
Open Terms. The common law of contracts was uneasy about transactions
that left open certain terms that parties would normally agree upon, partic-
ularly open price terms.29 The Code has resolved this uneasiness by al-
lowing parties to form contracts even though the price term is not settled.
30
In an opinion that carefully follows the Code rules on open terms, the
court in Alamo Clay Products, Inc. v. Gunn Tile Co.31 concluded that a
valid contract of sale was formed by telephone conversations followed by a
written confirmation even though terms regarding price, place of delivery,
and time of delivery were left open.32 In each instance the Code provides
a gap-filling term to meet the basic contract formation provisions of sec-
tion 2.204.33
25. Id. at 60.
26. Id.
27. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
28. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-21 (2d ed. 1980).
29. Prosser, Open Price in Contractsfor the Sale of Goods, 16 MINN. L. REV. 733 (1932).
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
31. 597 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
32. Id. at 391-92.
33. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN..§ 2.204(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
"[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." Id.
f ¢ol. 35
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B. Interpretation of Sales Contracts
Parol Evidence. By way of contrast to the careful attention paid to the
Code in Alamo Clay Products,34 the case of Caviness Packing Co. v. Cor-
bert35 deserves brief mention. In Caviness the plaintiff had contracted to
sell cattle to the defendant. By the delivery date the cattle exceeded the
weight desired by the buyer. The court approved the introduction of parol
evidence to explain the weight term (which was ambiguous), 36 but denied
the introduction of parol evidence to show that the weight term was not
material. 37 The court cited a 1956 treatise 38 and various pre-Code and
non-Code cases in support of this result. 39 At no point did the court dis-
cuss the Code parol evidence rule contained in section 2.202.40 That sec-
tion requires that a determination be made whether a writing was
"intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with re-
spect to such terms as are included therein."' 4' Such a determination was
never made in Caviness. Whether this determination would have altered
the result is not important, but use of the proper version of the sale of
goods parol evidence rule would have been desirable.
C. Warranties
Tort or Contract. The Texas Supreme Court has previously attempted to
draw a distinction between property damage claims based on strict prod-
ucts liability in tort and property damage claims based on implied war-
ranty under the Code.42 As the distinction seems to stand currently, a
plaintiff who suffers physical damage to property because of an unreasona-
bly dangerous product, other than damage to the product itself, can re-
cover in strict liability or warranty, 4 3 but a plaintiff who suffers nothing
more than loss of product use or physical damage to the product itself can
recover only in warranty;44 strict liability will not lie for "mere" economic
§ 2.204(c) provides that "[elven though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." The gap-filling terms used by
the court include id. §§ 2.305(a) (price), .308(l) (place of delivery), .309(a) (time for deliv-
ery).
34. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
35. 587 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
36. Id. at 546.
37. Id. at 547.
38. 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1601 (Texas Practice 2d
ed. 1956).
39. 587 S.W.2d at 545-46; see Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex.
574, 136 S.W.2d 800 (1940); Paxton v. Spencer, 503 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1973, no writ); Cutrer v. Cutrer, 334 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio
1960), ar7'd, 345 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. 1961).
40. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
41. Id.
42. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978); Mid
Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978);
Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
43. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. 1978).
44. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
308, 312-13 (Tex. 1978).
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loss. 4 5 The distinction hinges on whether property other than the product
itself was damaged by the unreasonably dangerous product.46 This "other
property" test was adopted over vigorous objection by Justice Pope.4 7
The other property test was applied during the survey period in the Fifth
Circuit case of Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Service.48 In Two Rivers
the court, applying Texas law, denied recovery to a purchaser of bull se-
men who suffered losses when some of the cattle owned by the purchaser,
and artificially inseminated with the semen, produced calves suffering
from syndactylism, a recessive genetic defect. The court very carefully an-
alyzed the other property test and concluded:
Arguably, a calf is a continuation of the product (bull semen) so any
damage was to the product itself and not to any other property ...
On the other hand, it could just as easily be argued that the product
(bull semen) is a constituent part of a new product (the calf) which is
other property.49
Because the other property test did not resolve the question, the court
turned to a consideration of the underlying policy rationales of strict prod-
ucts liability and implied warranty. The court stated that a central ration-
ale for strict liability in tort is the protection of consumers from products
that are dangerous to an extent not contemplated by the ordinary user with
knowledge of the characteristics of the product.50 The court noted that
cattle breeders expect that bull semen will carry some recessive genes.5 '
On the rationale for implied warranty, the court concluded that warranty
is designed to protect a purchaser against losing the benefit of his or her
bargain.5 2 As the final result of this policy evaluation, the court held that
the case was one of economic loss, governed by commercial law, and not a
case of strict liability in tort, 53 but because an effective written disclaimer
of implied warranties had been made, the court held that the purchaser
could not successfully recover on the warranty theory.54 The result
reached in this case provoked a strong dissent by Judge Tate.55
In another tort or contract case, the Tyler court of civil appeals held that
an employee of a buyer of sulfuric acid could not maintain an implied
warranty action under the Code for personal injuries sustained when a
container of acid broke, because the employee was not in privity with the
seller of the acid.56 According to the court, "[t]he gravamen of [the em-
45. Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Tex. 1977).
46. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
308, 312-13 (Tex. 1978).
47. Id. at 313 (Pope, J., dissenting).
48. 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 1247-48 (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 1249-50.
51. Id. at 1249.
52. Id. at 1250.
53. Id. at 1251.
54. Id. at 1252-53.
55. Id. at 1253-55.
56. Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980),
rev'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127 (Dec. 20, 1980).
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ployee's] cause of action is an action based on strict liability in tort for the
recovery of personal injuries by an allegedly defective product. '57 This
holding barred the plaintiffs recovery because the two-year statute of limi-
tations58 had run on his tort action, and because the case was not one in
warranty, the four-year statute of limitations on sales actions under the
Code was rendered unavailable.59 On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court,
the civil appeals decision was reversed and the case remanded for trial on
the plaintiffs implied warranty claim.60 The supreme court held that sev-
eral provisions of the Code clearly demonstrated a legislative intent to per-
mit actions for personal injury on a theory of implied warranty.61 The
court reasoned that the plaintiffs personal injury claim, therefore, properly
could be maintained on a warranty theory.62 The court further held that
privity of contract was not required in an implied warranty action brought
under the Code to recover for personal injury.63
Express Warranties by Sample--Privily Required? In an interesting pair of
cases, the Tyler court of civil appeals 64 has gone in one direction on the
issue of privity in sales by sample and the Dallas court of civil appeals65
has gone in exactly the opposite direction. In each case a manufacturing
seller had provided an intermediate seller with product samples and the
intermediate seller had submitted the samples to the ultimate purchaser to
induce a sale. Shipment of the goods ordered by the ultimate purchaser
was made directly from the manufacturer to the purchaser, with the order
being handled through the services of the intermediate seller. When the
goods failed to live up to the purchasers' expectations, they sued the manu-
facturer on a theory of express warranty created by the samples provided
to the intermediate sellers by the manufacturer.
The Tyler court of civil appeals held that privity of contract was re-
quired in actions for breach of express warranty66 and that such privity did
not exist between the purchaser and the remote seller.67 The court noted
that while Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers68 had eroded the doc-
trine of privity in implied warranty cases, the Texas Supreme Court in
57. 598 S.W.2d at 30.
58. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
59. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
60. Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127, 134 (Dec. 20, 1980).
61. Id. at 129-31, The court discussed TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314,
.715(2)(b), .719(3), .725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), in reaching this conclusion.
62. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 131.
63. Id. at 134. The court said that a contrary conclusion would not be "consistent with
our [earlier] holding in Nobility Homes. . . . which authorized the maintenance of an im-
plied warranty action for economic loss in the absence of privity." 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 133.
64. Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enterprises, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
65. Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1980, no writ).
66. Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enterprises, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
67. Id. at 417.
68. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
1981]
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Nobility had said that its decision did not affect remedies based upon
breach of express warranties.69 Judgment was rendered against the pur-
chaser.70
In contrast, the Dallas court of civil appeals, also referring to Nobility,7 '
held that the "same policy reasons for dispensing with the privity require-
ment in implied warranty also exist with respect to express warranties by
sample. 72 Having decided that a lack of privity was no obstacle to the
purchaser's action, the court went on to hold "that privity is not required
where a manufacturer induces the purchase by furnishing samples to a
middleman, knowing that the middleman will use the samples to induce
sales of the product."' 73 Because of procedural matters that had not been
dealt with adequately at trial, the purchaser's action against the remote
seller was remanded for a new trial.74
Implied Warranties of Quality in Sale of Used Goods. In Bunting v. Fodor75
the purchaser of a used automobile engine block sued the seller on theories
of express warranty, implied warranty, and violations of the DTPA.76 The
seller consistently had honored his obligations under the express warranty,
and thus no showing of breach of an express warranty could be made. 77
Noting that the DTPA did not create any warranties, 78 but rather only
provided special remedies for their breach, 79 the court turned to a consid-
eration of implied warranties under the Code to see if such warranties
arose in the sale of used goods.80 Relying on an earlier Texas decision
under the Code,8' the court concluded that the implied warranty of
merchantability did not apply to the sale of used goods. 82 Therefore, no
recovery under the DTPA was allowed. 83
While Bunting represents a correct reading of prior Texas law in the
courts of civil appeals, this author is intrigued by a portion of the Texas
Supreme Court opinion in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Service, Inc. 84 and its relation to implied warranties in the sale of
used goods. That case involved the sale of a used aircraft and a subse-
69. 592 S.W.2d at 415 (citing Nobility, 557 S.W.2d at 80).
70, 592 S.W.2d at 418.
71. Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 290.
75. 586 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
76. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
77. 586 S.W.2d at 145.
78. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(19) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
79. See id. § 17.50.
80. The primary warranty considered by the court was the implied warranty of
merchantability under id. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
81. Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
82. 586 S.W.2d at 146.
83. Id.
84. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
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quent action brought on theories of strict products liability and breach of
implied warranty. Most of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of the
other property test and whether strict products liability would lie for eco-
nomic loss. 8 5 In the last three paragraphs of the opinion, however, the
supreme court discusses the effectiveness of an "as is" disclaimer involved
in the case and notes that "[wJith that disclaimer Mid Continent has effec-
tively eliminated the implied warranties involved in the sale of the air-
plane. '8 6 If the court did not intend to hold that implied warranties could
attach to the sale of used goods, there would have been no need for the
court to address the question of whether the disclaimer was effective.
Therefore, one could argue that the Texas Supreme Court has recognized
that implied warranties exist in the sale of used goods. To the best of this
author's knowledge, this point has not been raised in a used goods case.
Implied Warranty of Title in Sale of Used Goods. One implied warranty
that Texas courts consistently have imposed on the sale of used goods is
the implied warranty of good title arising under section 2.312 of the
Code.87 Mitchell v. Webb 88 continues this trend, the court holding that an
implied warranty of title runs with the goods, so that a buyer may sue a
remote vendor.89 Treble damages under the DTPA were also allowed for
the warranty breach.90
Implied Warranties of Quality-Disclaimer. Section 2.316(b) of the Code
sets out the standards that a warranty disclaimer must meet to exclude
implied warranties.9 ' In Willoughby v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 92 the Beaumont
court of civil appeals held that a disclaimer that was never brought to the
attention of the buyer did not qualify as an effective disclaimer of implied
warranties under the Code.93 The case was reversed and remanded for
trial on the implied warranty claim.94
Implied Warranties of Quality--Notice of Breach. Section 2.607(c) requires
that notice of a warranty breach must be given by a buyer to his seller
85. Id. at 310-13; see notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
86. 572 S.W.2d at 313 (emphasis added).
87. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see, e.g.,
Gunderland Marine Supply, Inc. v. Bray, 570 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Trial v. McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no
writ) (A part of the holding, not relevant to § 2.312, was reversed and remanded. The hold-
ing of the district court was affirmed on remand. 581 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, no writ)).
88. 591 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
89. Id. at 551.
90. Id. at 552. The applicable provision of the DTPA permitted the trebling of actual
damages for warranty breach. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 327. The statute has
since been amended to reduce the amount of punitive damages that might be recoverable in
a breach of warranty action. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
91. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
92. 601 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. Id. at 388.
94. Id. at 389.
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before an action for the breach can be maintained. 95 In what might be a
significant opinion on the interpretation of section 2.607(c), the El Paso
court of civil appeals decided that notice of breach of an implied warranty
of merchantability needs to be given only to the buyer's immediate seller,
and that an action by the buyer could be maintained against the remote
manufacturer without complying with the section 2.607(c) notice require-
ment.9
6
D. Performance of Sales Contracts
Identfication of Goods and Passing of Title. In Miles v. Starks97 the court
properly construed and applied the provisions of section 2.40198 in con-
cluding that the parties could agree as to the time when title would pass,
and in ruling that physical delivery of the goods was not required when
such an agreement had been made.9 9 The court further decided that, by
operation of section 2.501 (a), 100 a buyer could obtain an insurable, special
property interest in the goods by identification, even though the goods
might be nonconforming and the buyer had an option to reject or return
them. I01 Under either rationale, the seller was entitled to recover under
the terms of the buyer's livestock dealer's bond, which guaranteed pay-
ment for cattle purchased by the buyer.
Delegation of Performance. In a case of first impression 10 2 the Tyler court
of civil appeals interpreted the delegation of performance provisions of
section 2.210.103 The court held that the buyer of a horse who had con-
tracted to allow the seller to use the animal twice each year for breeding
purposes could effectively delegate the duty of making the horse available
to the seller when the buyer resold the horse to a second buyer. 10 4 The
court reasoned that the duty of performance could be enforced by either
the original seller or by the first buyer.1°5 The only prior case interpreting
the delegation of duty provisions of section 2.210 was concerned with the
duty to pay and not with duties to continue other contractual perform-
ances. 106
95. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
96. Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, no writ).
97. 590 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
98. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
99. 590 S.W.2d at 225.
100. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.501(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
101. 590 S.W.2d at 226.
102. McKinnie v. Milford, 597 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.).
103. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.210 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
104. McKinnie v. Milford, 597 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.).
105. Id.





Seller's Remedies-Liquidated Damages. In Speedi Lubrication Centers,
Inc. v. Atlas Match Corp. 107 the court upheld a liquidated damages clause
that permitted the seller to recover fifty percent of the contract price of
advertising matchbooks if the buyer repudiated before the goods had been
identified to the contract. The court inquired whether fifty percent was
reasonable compensation for the breach or whether that amount actually
would operate as a penalty.' 0 8 Based on uncontradicted testimony by an
officer of Atlas to the effect that the production process involved heavy
start-up costs for commissions, art work, and the like, and that such costs
could not readily be allocated to particular jobs under the Atlas process-
cost accounting system, the court held the liquidated damages clause to be
reasonable. '0 9
Seller's Remedies-Lost Profits. Under section 2.708(b)110 the usual lost
profits case is one in which a seller is not adequately compensated by the
contract price/market price differential' and seeks to recover lost profits
as a substitute measure of damage. A good example of this kind of case is
the lost volume seller who deals in standard priced goods. The contract
price/market price differential is zero in such a case, but the seller has lost
a sale (i e., an opportunity to sell one more unit than would otherwise be
sold). Section 2.708(b) is designed to allow recovery of the profit that the
seller expected to earn on this lost sale.
In Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co. Ilz the Fifth Circuit con-
fronted a case in which the usual contract price/market price differential
would have overcompensated the plaintiff-seller. The defendant-buyer ar-
gued that section 2.708(b) should operate to limit the measure of damages.
The court could find no prior case law from any jurisdiction directly on
point, but it did cite and discuss a number of commentaries that had con-
sidered this heretofore academic matter.' '3 The most persuasive argument
in the court's view was that the basic philosophy of the Code is compensa-
tion and not the imposition of penalties.' '4 Because the use of the ordi-
nary contract/market formula would overcompensate the seller and
penalize the buyer, the court held that the section 2.708(b) lost profits
measure of damage should control to limit the seller's recovery." 15
107. 595 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
108. Id. at 914-15. The test used by the court is the same as that specified in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.718(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), although that provision was not
cited by the court.
109. 595 S.W.2d at 915.
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
Ill. Id. § 2.708(a).
112. 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 214-15.
114. Id. at 215. The court cited TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.106(a) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968) and J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-10, at 228 (1972) in its discussion of this point. 616 F.2d at
215.
115. 616 F.2d at 216.
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Buyer's Remediesfor Breach of Warranty-Pleading. The general measure
of damages for breach of warranty is the "difference at the time and place
of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted."" 6 In an action for breach
of warranty brought by a mobile home buyer, the buyer attempted to in-
troduce evidence to show the cost of repairing the mobile home by plead-
ings that sought to recover for the difference between the actual value and
the market value of the mobile home.' '7 The Texas Supreme Court held
that there was a fatal variance between the buyer's pleadings and the of-
fered proof, and affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendant manufac-
turer. 118
Buyer's Remedies for Breach of a Warranty of Repair. In Smith v. Kin-
slow ' 19 the plaintiffs sought recovery for repair costs paid by them for
work done on a motor vehicle. The defendant had repaired plaintiffs' ve-
hicle and had expressly warranted the repair for six months or 6,000 miles,
whichever came first. A defect covered by the warranty was discovered
within the warranty period, but the defendant refused to honor the war-
ranty and disassembled the vehicle instead. The plaintiffs were thus de-
prived of the entire benefit of the prior repairs for which they had paid. In
the plaintiffs' action for breach of the repair warranty and for treble dam-
ages under the DTPA,' 20 the Dallas court of civil appeals held that the
breach was to be measured by the amount paid for the worthless repairs'2'
and that this sum should be trebled under the DTPA to determine the
amount of the plaintiffs' recovery. 122 The plaintiffs were not, however,
held entitled to recover the consideration paid for the repairs in addition to
treble damages because the court viewed these two remedies as mutually
exclusive. 123 Attorney's fees, as a separate element of damage under the
DTPA, were allowed to the plaintiffs.' 24
F. Good Faith Purchase and Collateral Estoppel
Sale in Exchange for Worthless Check. Section 2.403(a) of the Code pro-
vides in part that "[a] person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value."12 5 A common situation
under this section is the delivery of goods to a person in exchange for a
check that is later dishonored. When the disappointed seller tries to re-
116. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.714(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
117. Kissman v. Bendix Home Syss., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1979).
118. Id. at 678.
119. 598 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
120. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 327. The case was not affected by the 1979
amendments to the DTPA. For the current version of the applicable provision, see TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
121. 598 S.W.2d at 914.
122. Id. at 915.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 916; see 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § I, at 327 (current version at TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981)).
125. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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claim the goods, he or she learns that the buyer has already transferred
them to a good faith purchaser. Section 2.403(a) operates to prevent the
original seller from reaching the goods in the hands of the good faith pur-
chaser. In Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. 126 the federal district
court for the Northern District of Texas had no difficulty in applying sec-
tion 2.403(a) to bar an action by the original unpaid sellers of cattle against
a meatpacking company that had purchased the cattle in good faith from
an intermediate (and insolvent) cattle buyer.
To this extent, the case is merely one more citation in the growing list of
cattle cases decided under section 2.403.127 Rufenacht does, however, in-
volve a further interesting aspect. One of the theories of recovery asserted
by the plaintiff-sellers was that the intermediate cattle buyer had acted as
an agent of the meatpacking company, ' 28 and that this issue of agency had
already been decided adversely to the company in two prior lawsuits
brought by other plaintiffs, but involving the same fact issues. ' 29 In Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,130 a 1979 decision, the United States Supreme
Court expressly approved the offensive use of collateral estoppel, subject to
the discretion of the trial court, to determine when such offensive use
would be appropriate. The district court in Rufenacht examined the fact
issues on the question of agency as they appeared from special interrogato-
ries used in prior cases and concluded that offensive collateral estoppel
could not be used in the case at bar because there was not sufficient factual
identity with prior cases.' 3'
Vouching In. In CGM Valve Co. v. Gulfsream Steel Corp. 132 the court of
civil appeals considered the use of the "vouching in" procedure under sec-
tion 2.607(e)(1) of the Code. 133 That section allows a buyer who is sued on
an obligation for which his own seller is answerable to give the seller writ-
ten notice of the litigation. ' 34 If the notice tenders defense of the litigation
to the seller and the seller does not defend, all determinations of fact in the
litigation become binding on the seller in a subsequent action against him
on the same obligation brought by the buyer. 13  In CGM the buyer gave
the requisite notice and the seller did not appear to defend. The buyer
then proceeded to settle the first litigation without trial of the fact issues.
In an action against the seller on the obligation that was the subject matter
of the settled litigation, the buyer moved for summary judgment on the
ground that all fact issues had been concluded effectively against the seller
126. 492 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
127. See, e.g., Sorrels v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 597 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979); Samuels
& Co. v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
128. 492 F. Supp. at 880.
129. Id. at 883; see Valley View Cattle Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 548 F.2d 1219
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977).
130. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
131. 492 F. Supp. at 883-85.
132. 596 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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by the vouching in procedure and the settlement. The court held that
vouching in requires a full adversary proceeding.1 36 The court ruled that
the settlement of the earlier lawsuit did not qualify as such a proceeding,
and the buyer was held not entitled to a summary judgment because the
fact issues of liability had never been actually litigated. 37 The case was
remanded for trial.138 This decision is consistent with the language in sec-
tion 2.607(e)(1) and contains a good discussion of how the very useful de-
vice of vouching in should be handled.
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
(CHAPTER 3)
A. Form of Negotiable Instruments
Unconditional Promise to Pay a Sum Certain. Among the several formal
requirements for negotiable instruments listed in section 3.104 of the Code
are the requirements that an instrument must "contain an unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain in money."' 139 The Dallas court of
civil appeals ruled that the deed of trust note involved in Hinckley v. Eg-
gers140 failed to meet both the unconditional promise and the sum certain
requirements. 141 The note in question disclaimed personal liability of the
makers and provided that payment was to be made only from the proceeds
of the sale of the property securing the note. 142 Such a limitation clearly
makes the promise conditional under section 3.105(b)(2),143 which oper-
ates to define the basic requirement stated in section 3.104.
On the sum certain question, the note provided that the makers would
be personally liable for an amount equal to any taxes and interest accrued
at the time of acceleration or foreclosure, whichever occurred last. 144 Sec-
tion 3.106 provides that the amount due must be determinable from the
instrument itself (with any computation that may be necessary). 45 Be-
cause taxes due could not be determined without reference to an outside
source, the court found that the sum certain requirement was not met.' 46
The court also held that, even if taxes were disregarded, it would be anom-
alous to hold that the note was negotiable with respect to interest, because
that sum was determinable when the promise to pay the principal sum did
136. 596 S.W.2d at 163.
137. Id. at 164.
138. Id.
139. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
140. 587 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
141. Id. at 450.
142. Id. at 450-51.
143. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.105(b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
"A promise or order is not unconditional if the instrument.., states that it is to be paid
only out of a particular fund or source ..
144. 587 S.W.2d at 450.
145. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.106(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The underly-
ing philosophy of the section is described in Official Comment I thereto. Id., comment 1.
146. 587 S.W.2d at 451.
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not qualify as an unconditional promise. 147
On the matter of the sum certain requirement, some current attempts to
link the interest rate on real estate mortgage notes to a certain index figure
as a method of dealing with inflationary pressures in the home mortgage
market may well run afoul of section 3.106. Such notes would not be ille-
gal or usurious because of that section, but they would be nonnegotiable.
Legislation may be needed to solve this particular problem.
B. Liability of Parties
Liability of Parties Signing in a Representative Capacity. The question of
whether a person who has signed a negotiable instrument acted in a per-
sonal capacity or only in a representative capacity has been frequently liti-
gated in Texas.' 48 Section 3.403 deals with signatures made in a
representative capacity,' 49 and comment 3 to that section states a useful
rule that aids in understanding the operation of the section. 150 According
to the comment, the unambiguous way to show that a signature is made in
a representative capacity is to sign in the form "Peter Pringle by Arthur
Adams, Agent."' 5 ' Any signature that is less clear than this example
opens the door to a possible claim that the representative is personally
obligated on the instrument.
Four cases were reported during this survey period in which agents
failed to make their representative capacity sufficiently clear. 152 While the
results of the cases vary as to whether the agents were ultimately held per-
sonally liable, all four cases deal with the question of personal liability as
an issue of fact, which is the proper method of resolving the question
under section 3.403. There is no need to detail the particular factual set-
ting of each case, but one of the cases, Wolf v. Little John Corp. of Libe-
ria,153 deserves particular mention because of its careful discussion of
section 3.403 and the earlier Texas cases interpreting the legal effect of that
section.1 54 The case is a good review of the personal liability/
representative capacity area in the law of negotiable instruments.
Liability of Commercial Paper Guarantors. Another area of frequent litiga-
tion has been the scope of liability of persons who act as guarantors of
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Griffin v. EUinger, 538 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. 1976); Scale v. Nichols, 505
S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974); Walker v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 559 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1977, no writ).
149. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
150. Id., comment 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
151. Id., comment 3(c).
152. Antil v. Southwest Envelope Co., 601 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979,
no writ); Mentesana v. Fabricators Int'l, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Alsup v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 591 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, no writ); Wolf v. Little John Corp. of Liberia, 585 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
153. 585 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, no writ).
154. Id. at 776-77.
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negotiable instruments. 155 There are two principal categories of guaran-
tors under section 3.416: those who guarantee payment 56 and those who
guarantee collection. 15 7 The liability of a guarantor of payment is
equivalent to that of a co-maker, and, accordingly, such guarantors have
been held absolutely liable on the guaranteed instruments. 58 This posi-
tion was reaffirmed by the Texas Supreme Court in Ferguson P. McCar-
rell.159 In a brief per curiam opinion the court refused an application for
writ of error 60 from the decision of the court of civil appeals' 61 that had
adopted the position noted above and, in the refusal, expressly disap-
proved the conflicting holding of Cook v. Citizens National Bank, 62 which
had cast doubt on the scope of liability of one who guarantees payment
under section 3.416.163
The category of collection guarantors was considered in Wolfe v.
Schuster. 164 The court of civil appeals, in a well-reasoned opinion written
by Judge Guittard, held that a guaranty of collection required the plaintiff,
in a suit against the guarantor, to join the principal debtor in the action, or
to plead and prove facts to excuse nonjoinder by bringing the case within
one of the exceptions provided in the Texas statutes and the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure. 165 The Dallas court also discussed the effect of the
supreme court's ruling in Ferguson v. McCarrel1166 on the joinder require-
ments applicable to suits brought on guaranty agreements. 167
C. Enforcement of Commercial Paper
Enforcement in Summary Judgment Cases. A well-established principle in
the law of commercial paper is that "[w]hen signatures are admitted or
established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it
155. See, e.g., Reece v. First State Bank, 566 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1978); Hopkins v. First
Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977); Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539
S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
156. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
157. Id. § 3.416(b).
158. See Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 877-79 (Tex. 1976).
159. 588 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1979).
160. Id.
161. 582 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979).
162. 538 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
163. 588 S.W.2d at 895.
164. 591 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
165. The statutes involved are TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(b) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968) and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1986-1987 (Vernon 1964). The rule of
civil procedure is TEX. R. Civ. P. 31. The provisions of § 3.416(b) are illustrative of the
reasons why joinder is not required in certain cases. Section 3.416(b) provides:
"Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that
the signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it
according to its tenor, but only after the holder has reduced his claim against
the maker or acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned unsatis-
fied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise
apparent that it is useless to proceed against him.
166. 588 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. 1979); see text accompanying notes 159-63 supra.
167. 591 S.W.2d at 932 n.2.
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unless the defendant establishes a defense."' 68 Because of this principle,
motions for summary judgment in favor of the holder frequently are suc-
cessful because of the failure of the defendant to make a prima facie show-
ing that a defense exists. Several cases reported during the survey period
fit this pattern.' 69 In each case, the plaintiff holder moved for summary
judgment and the maker or drawer was unsuccessful in showing that a
triable issue of material fact concerning a defense existed; judgments in
favor of the holders were affirmed. The failure to present more than con-
clusory statements about the existence of the alleged defenses was the most
common difficulty faced by the defendants in resisting the motions for
summary judgment. Under the standards developed by the Texas
Supreme Court regarding the burden placed on the party resisting a mo-
tion for summary judgment, affidavits opposing a motion must set forth
facts that would be admissible in evidence; conclusions without probative
value are insufficient to raise an issue of fact.' 70 These cases clearly illus-
trate that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment in a commer-
cial paper case must establish that a defense exists. 17 1
Proper Party to Enforce an Instrument. According to section 3.301: "The
holder of an instrument . . . may . . . enforce payment in his own
name."' 172 One may become a holder only by negotiation and, in the case
of instruments payable to order, negotiation requires delivery together
with any necessary indorsement. 173 Absent negotiation, the taker of an
instrument is a mere transferee and is not aided by the presumption that
"production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it."174 All
these issues were raised in Lawson v. Gibbs,' 75 in which the holder of a
vendor's lien note used the note as collateral to obtain a loan from the
Main Bank of Houston. The note was indorsed and delivered to the bank
in exchange for the loan. The debtor subsequently defaulted on the note,
and the bank, through the appointment of a substitute trustee, sold the
land securing the note to the highest bidder at a trustee's sale. In the
meantime, the original vendee of the land sold the property to another
purchaser. In a suit to quiet title and to declare the sale by the substitute
trustee void, the court of civil appeals held that, by operation of various
168. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
169. See Wooldridge v. Groos Nat'l Bank, 603 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980,
no writ); Manges v. Astra Bar, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. A pp.-Corpus Christi 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Guardian Bank v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n, 593 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sims v. Wiechers, 589 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
170. See Life Ins. Co. v. Gar-Dal, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex. 1978); Crain v. Davis,
417 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. 1967).
171. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
172. Id. § 3.301.
173. Id. § 3.202(a).
174. Id. § 3.307(b). This special right of a "holder" is discussed at text accompanying
note 168 supra.
175. 591 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Code provisions, 176 the bank had acquired the rights of a holder and, as
such, was entitled to appoint the trustee and effect a sale of the property. 177
As between the competing claimants, the court held that the purchaser at
the trustee sale was entitled to judgment in his favor. 178 The Lawson case
contains a good review of the substantial rights accorded a holder as con-
trasted to the rights of a mere transferee.
Jus Terti Defenses to Enforcement of Instruments. By its very nature, com-
mercial paper is designed to be easily negotiated from one person to an-
other. This ease of negotiation means that a negotiable instrument may be
passed out of the hands of the original payee into the hands of subsequent
holders; indeed, the chain of indorsers may become so long that a separate
page must be attached to the instrument to contain the indorsements. 179
Because remote parties may be on opposite sides of the same lawsuit in
actions brought to enforce an instrument, the early law of negotiable in-
struments restricted the ability of a prior. party to assert the defenses of
other intermediate parties against the claim of the remote holder who
sought to enforce the instrument.18 0 Such third-party defenses were called
jus tertii defenses, and those that could properly be asserted were severely
limited.' 8' Section 3.306(4) of the Code 82 continues this common law
limitation on the ability of a maker to assert third-party (jus tertii) de-
fenses. Only two such defenses can be raised: (1) the defense that the
holder, or a person through whom he or she holds the instrument, acquired
it by theft; and (2) the defense that payment to the holder would be incon-
sistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement. 8 3 No other third-party
defenses are available. 8 4
In Landscape Design & Construction, Inc. v. Warren'8 5 the maker issued
a note to the payee, who indorsed and delivered the note to the indorsee.
Upon default in payment, the indorsee sued both the payee and the maker.
176. The court cites TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(20), 3.202(a), .301, .302(a)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), in support of its holding. 591 S.W.2d at 294.
177. 591 S.W.2d at 294.
178. Id. at 295.
179. Such a separate page is called an "allonge," and its use is provided for in TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). But see id., comment 3 (indorse-
ment on a mortgage or other separate paper not sufficient for negotiation). The word itself is
French and means "lengthened, elongated or out-stretched." CASSELL'S FRENCH DICTION-
ARY (1962 ed.). It has been suggested that use of the allonge developed so that negotiable
instruments could serve as currency substitutes in regions where currency was scarce, such as
remote areas of Indonesia during the 19th century. See Llewellyn, Meet Negotiable Instru-
ments, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 312-14 (1944). For a modem case involving the claimed use
of an allonge, see Estrada v. River Oaks Bank & Trust Co., 550 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ retd n.r.e.).
180. See, e.g., Pronty v. Roberts, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 19 (1850); Brown v. Penfield, 36
N.Y. 473 (1867).
181. See W. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES § 160 (2d ed.
1961).
182. TEX. Bus & COM. CODE § 3.306(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. 598 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The maker sought to defend on the ground that the indorsee had failed to
perform the consideration promised to the payee in exchange for the note,
but the court properly held that this third-party defense was not available
to the maker as a defense to the indorsee's claim. 186 The court, however,
did not refer to section 3.306(4) in deciding this issue, an omission that
may have led to the erroneous decision of the court in the second portion
of its opinion. Because the indorsee had sued both the maker and the
payee jointly, section 3.306(4) would have permitted the payee to defend
the action on behalf of both defendants because the alleged failure of con-
sideration was not a third-party defense vis-A-vis the payee.' 87 The court
did not recognize this point, holding instead that in the indorsee's action
against the payee, the contract of indorsement liability described in section
3.414188 created an absolute liability on the part of the payee, whether or
not a failure of consideration existed in the transfer between payee and
indorsee.189 In the language of the court: "[Payee's] liability was fixed and
it became obligated to pay the note whether it received consideration or
not from Warren [the indorsee]. There need be no consideration moving
to the endorser in order to hold him liable on his endorsement."' 190
This part of the decision is in direct conflict with section 3.306, which
provides: "Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person
takes the instrument subject to . . . (3) the defenses of want or failure of
consideration ... ,,191 If the failure of consideration had actually oc-
curred, the indorsee-holder would not have satisfied the "value" require-
ment for holding in due course 192 and clearly would be within the
provisions of this section. Culberson v. Hawkins,193 cited by the Landscape
Design court, 194 involved a pure suretyship problem. In Culberson the
court held that an accommodation indorser who had indorsed before de-
livery was liable to the plaintiff-holder even though the indorser had not
received any direct consideration. 195 A consideration moving to the maker
was held sufficient to bind the indorser to his surety indorsement con-
tract. 196 This result would still obtain today under the Code in the area of
suretyship but it is not applicable to ordinary problems of transfer and
186. Id. at 40.
187. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.306(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) specifically
provides: "The claim of any third person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a
defense to any party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the action for
such party." Because the payee was already a party to the action, the maker would not have
needed to use any procedural devices such as those suggested in the last paragraph of id.
§ 3.306, comment 5, to bring the payee into the lawsuit.
188. Id. § 3.414(a).
189. 598 S.W.2d at 40.
190. Id. (citing Culberson v. Hawkins, 321 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959,
no writ)).
191. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.306 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
192. Id. § 3.302(a)(1).
193. 321 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ).
194. 598 S.W.2d at 40.




negotiation of instruments.197 Accordingly, the second portion of the
Landscape Design opinion should be disapproved.
IV. BANK TRANSACTIONS
(CHAPTER 4)
A. Duties of Collecting Banks
Charge-Back of Foreign Currency Instruments. In Austin National Bank v.
Romo 198 the plaintiffs purchased a $45,000 certificate of deposit from the
defendant bank on August 26, 1976. Payment for the certificate was made
by means of a check for 562,500 Mexican pesos drawn on the Banco Na-
cional de Mexico. The check named the defendant bank as payee. As of
August 26th, 562,500 Mexican pesos were equivalent to 45,000 United
States dollars. Instead of taking the certificate with them, the plaintiffs left
the instrument with the bank for safekeeping, and a receipt was given to
them to evidence the bailment.
The check was forwarded to the Banco Nacional de Mexico for payment
(presumably through banking channels, although the opinion is silent on
the point), and when the check was presented to the Mexican bank for
payment, it was paid in the full face amount of 562,500 pesos. Because the
Mexican government had announced a devaluation of the peso shortly af-
ter August 26th, 199 however, the exchange yield to the defendant bank was
only $27,463.87. On September 24, 1976, the defendant bank unilaterally
issued a new certificate of deposit in the sum of $27,463.87, backdated to
August 26th, and attempted to cancel the $45,000 certificate. Plaintiffs
sued to recover the difference between the two certificates. The court of
civil appeals held that, because the defendant bank had failed to receive
"full settlement" or "full value" for the peso check, the bank was entitled
to charge back the loss resulting from devaluation pursuant to section
4.212(a) of the Code. 2°° The court briefly referred to section 4.212(f), deal-
197. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.415 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) would apply to
such cases today. The operation of § 3.415 as a part of the law of suretyship is discussed in
Eikel v. Bristow Corp., 529 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
The special problem of failure of consideration in the surety context is discussed in J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, § 13-14, at 523-24.
198. 598 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ granted).
199. According to Lakeway Co. v. Bravo, 576 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the devaluation occurred on Aug. 31, 1976. The opinion in Austin
Nat'l Bank v. Romo does not mention the date.
200. 598 S.W.2d at 33. The Code section referred to is TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.212(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), which provides in part:
If a collecting bank has made provisional settlement with its customer for an
item and itself fails by reason of dishonor, suspension of payments by a bank
or otherwise to receive a settlement for the item which is or becomes final, the
bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge back the amount of any
credit given for the item to its customer's account or obtain refund from its
customer whether or not it is able to return the items if by its midnight dead-
line or within a longer reasonable time after it learns the facts it returns the
item or sends notification of the facts. These rights to revoke, charge-back and
obtain refund terminate if and when a settlement for the item received by the
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ing with the charge-back of foreign currency items, 20 1 and concluded that
section 4.212(f) was designed "to determine the loss that the bank has in-
curred as a result of currency fluctuations. ' 20 2 According to the court,
once the amount of loss is determined, section 4.212(a) could be used to
charge the loss back to the customer.203 The court rendered a take-nothing
judgment against the plaintiffs.2°4
The decision by the court is open to question on several grounds. Ini-
tially, a serious issue exists as to whether the bank was acting as a collect-
ing bank or as the owner of the item. The risks of loss in the collection
process and the ability of a bank to charge back losses are determined in
part by deciding who owns the item being collected.20 5 The court decided
that the bank was acting as a collection agent, but did not explain fully
why this was so, particularly in light of the sale of the certificate of deposit
to the plaintiffs.20 6 At no point does the court suggest that the sale was less
than absolute.
Secondly, even if the court correctly determined that the bank was a
collecting bank, the facts leave no doubt that the bank received a final
settlement for the face amount of the peso check. Several Code sections
make receipt of such a final settlement the operative event to terminate
collecting bank status.20 7 Apparently the court recognized that receipt of a
final settlement would so operate, but attempted to avoid that result by
creating a requirement of full settlement or full value out of whole cloth,
and by holding that receipt of a final settlement that was less than full did
not terminate collecting bank status or the right to charge back.208 No
concept of full settlement exists in chapter 4, and the engrafting of such an
idea onto the statutory framework would drastically affect the operation of
several Code provisions. 20 9
bank is or becomes final (Subsection (c) of Section 4.211 and Subsections (b)
and (c) of Section 4.213).
201. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.212(f) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
If credit is given in dollars as the equivalent of the value of an item payable in
a foreign currency the dollar amount of any charge-back or refund shall be
calculated on the basis of the buying sight rate for the foreign currency pre-
vailing on the day when the person entitled to the charge-back or refund
learns that it will not receive payment in ordinary course.
202. 598 S.W.2d at 33.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.201(a) & comment 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
206. The court referred to id. § 4.201, comment 4 (probably 3), but apparently did not
recognize that comment 4 begs the question of the effect of the original transaction between
the parties. Id., comment 2 (last paragraph), would seem to be more directly on point on the
issue of ownership. The court made only brief mention of the jury findings early in its
opinion. See 598 S.W.2d at 31.
207. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.201(a), .211(c), .212(a), .213(c) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968). See also id. § 4.201, comment 4 (agency status of collecting bank
continues until collection completed); id. § 4.212, comment 3 (right of charge-back exists
during a provisional settlement but terminates upon final settlement); id. § 4.213, comment 9
(when collecting bank receives settlement it is accountable to customer for that amount).
208. See 598 S.W.2d at 32-33.
209. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.201(a), .21 1(c), .212(a), .213(c) (Tex.
19811
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Finally, even if the devaluation of a foreign currency presents an ap-
pealing opportunity to create a full settlement requirement to meet a per-
ceived need for flexibility, another method already exists under the Code
without restructuring chapter 4. Section 4.212(f) provides that, in foreign
currency cases, "any charge-back or refund shall be calculated on the basis
of the buying sight rate for the foreign currency prevailing on the day when
theperson entitled to the charge-back or refund learns that it will not receive
payment in ordinary course.' '210 Section 4.212(a) provides, in part, that
"[i]f a collecting bank. . . fails by reason of dishonor, suspension of pay-
ments by a bank or otherwise to receive a settlement for the item which is
or becomes final, the bank may revoke the settlement given by it. . . !f by
its midnight deadline or within a longer reasonable time . . . it . . . sends
notification of the facts."' 211 These two sections, considered together, cer-
tainly raise the possibility that a bank could be said to have learned that it
will not receive payment in ordinary course when a currency devaluation
is announced officially. Upon receiving such information, the reasonable
course would be to require the bank to act on the information and notify
the owner of an affected item within a short period of time. Section
4.212(a) normally would require action by the bank's midnight dead-
line,212 but the section explicitly allows a longer reasonable time if such
longer time is needed in a particular case. 213 In Romo the court did not
inquire into when the bank learned of the announced devaluation, nor did
the court inquire into the reasonableness of attempting a charge-back some
twenty-four days after the devaluation occurred. This line of analysis
would have been better than that used in the court's opinion.
The Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ in Romo.214 Its action in
dealing with this case will be of particular interest because section 4.212(f)
has never been interpreted in another reported case from any jurisdic-
tion.215
UCC) (Vernon 1968). One is reminded of the difference between the "at par" and "less than
par" collection systems that existed prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve System.
210. Id. § 4.212(0 (emphasis added). The section is quoted in full in note 201 supra.
211. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.212(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (emphasis
added). The section is quoted in full in note 200 supra.
212. The midnight deadline is defined as "midnight on [the bank's] next banking day
following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice." TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 4.104(a)(8) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
213. Id. § 4.212(a); see note 200 supra. The bank would have the burden of proving that
taking action after its midnight deadline was actually reasonable. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 4.202(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
214. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 95 (Dec. 6, 1980). [Author's Note: After this Article went to
print, the supreme court affirmed the Romo decision. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 239 (Feb. 21, 1981).
The opinion of the supreme court is a much better factual and theoretical analysis of the
Romo case and meets many of the objections to the court of civil appeals' opinion that are
discussed in the text above.]
215. The author has written elsewhere on the subject of foreign currency instruments
under the Code and has suggested, in light of the interpretive difficulties presented by ch. 4,
that a bank would be well advised to include a clause m its deposit contract spelling out the
allocation of the risk of loss due to currency fluctuation. See Krahmer, Foreign Currency
Instruments Under the Unform Commercial Code, 86 COM. L.J. 9 (1981). A sample deposit
clause is set out therein.
[Vol. 35
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
B. Duties of Payor Banks
Accountability of Payor Bank for Late Return of Items. Under section
4.302(1)216 a payor bank becomes accountable for the amount of a demand
item presented for payment if the bank fails to pay or return the item until
after the midnight deadline. 217 Documentary drafts are excepted from the
operation of this rule.21 8 Section 4.302219 has been characterized as impos-
ing a standard of "strict liability" on payor banks for the late return of
items.220
In Pecos County State Bank v. El Paso Livestock Auction Co. 221 the court
had no difficulty determining that a delay of ten days past the midnight
deadline rendered the payor bank accountable for the amount of a sight
draft that the bank had delayed in returning.222 The bank, to avoid liabil-
ity, argued that it was a collecting rather than a payor bank (supporting its
argument with pre-Code authority), but the court rejected this argu-
ment.
22 3
Documentary drafts are treated somewhat differently under section
4.302 because such drafts frequently carry their own statement of the time
limits within which action to pay or accept must be taken. A case involv-
ing twenty-six such drafts was reported during the survey period.224 In an
excellent opinion, Judge Politz of the Fifth Circuit carefully traced the
chapter 3 and chapter 4 treatment of documentary drafts and concluded
that a payor bank that had exceeded a stated twenty-four-hour time limit
for payment or return on twenty-four of the twenty-six drafts, by time peri-
ods varying from two days to twenty-three days, was accountable to the
presenting bank for the amounts of the drafts on which action was
delayed. 225
216. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
217. The definition of "midnight deadline" appears in note 212 supra.
218. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302(1) (Vernon 1968). Documentary drafts
are treated under id. § 4.302(2). A case involving documentary drafts under this section is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 224-25 infra.
219. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
220. See Continental Nat'l Bank v. Sanders, 581 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1979, no writ).
221. 586 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
222. Id. at 187.
223. Id. at 185-86.
224. Union Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 621 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1980).
225. Id. at 796. Judge Politz may be forgiven for being a little excessive in his meta-
phoric description of the Uniform Commercial Code. At the beginning of Part II of his
opinion, he states:
At first glance, the U.C.C. may appear to be a compendium of confusing
and seemingly contradictory rules enacted to govern myriad business transac-
tions. Upon closer scrutiny, the U.C.C. is found to be a finely tuned statutory
mechanism containing interlocking provisions designed to provide certainty in
commercial transactions. Once the pieces of this puzzle are correctly aligned,
the U.C.C. furnishes an answer to almost any question involving the rights
and liabilities of the parties to a covered transaction.
Id. at 792.
This description may be contrasted usefully with that of another person who has at least a
speaking acquaintance with the Code:
1981]
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C. Relationship Between a Payor Bank and Its Customer
Defense of Wrongful Dishonor Action. In Chandler v. El Paso National
Bank 226 a depositor sued his bank for alleged conspiracy to abuse the gar-
nishment process and for wrongful dishonor of various checks. The trial
court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant
bank,22 7 and the depositor appealed. The court of civil appeals reversed
the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings because of certain defects in the proof supporting the bank's motion
for summary judgment.228 As to the wrongful dishonor claim, however,
the court pointed out that if the bank could show that it impounded the
depositor's funds pursuant to a lawful writ of garnishment, and that it dis-
honored checks presented for payment out of those funds while the writ
was in effect, the bank would have a valid defense to the action.229 Ac-
cording to the court, this defense would be valid even if the funds im-
pounded were in excess of the garnisher's claim.230
D. Banks and the DTPA 231
Seeking a Loan Is Not Within the DTPA. In Riverside National Bank v.
Lewis232 the Texas Supreme Court held that a person who sought to ob-
tain a bank loan did not fall within the definition of "consumer" as it ex-
isted in May 1975233 and was not entitled to maintain an action under the
DTPA.234 In Riverside the person seeking the loan was prematurely ad-
vised that his loan application had been approved when, in fact, no ap-
proval had occurred. The application was ultimately turned down.
Because of his failure to obtain the loan, the applicant incurred losses in
In many ways Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code. . . is like a
huge machine assembled by a mad inventor and comprised of assorted
sprockets, gears, levers, pulleys, and belts....
In their study of the intricacies of Article Three, law students . . . see that
the inventor was far from mad, yet they are frustrated because they cannot see
the machine in action to find out whether the gears and belts, which look as if
they might not function properly, can, in fact, perform as planned. The dis-
cussion that follows will point out some places where the design looks defec-
tive. None of my complaints are fundamental. . . . Indeed, the words that
follow may be simply one more person's pulling on the levers and poking at
the innards of the machine.
White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (1967).
The author is, of course, J. White of J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, albeit in his
earlier literary days.
226. 589 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
227. Id. at 834.
228. Id. at 835.
229. Id. at 836.
230. Id.
231. The DTPA is codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
232. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980), opinion on remand, 605 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston list Dist.] 1980, no writ).
233. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 323. The definition then provided: " 'Con-
sumer' means an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or serv-
ices." Id.
234. 603 S.W.2d at 176.
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the repossession and resale of his car and in the resulting set-off of a defi-
ciency claim against his funds by another lender. The applicant brought
suit against the bank on theories of fraud and violations of the DTPA.
The Texas Supreme Court determined that, to qualify as a "consumer"
under the DTPA, one must seek to acquire "goods" or "services," 235 and
that an attempt to obtain a loan of money did not qualify under either
category. 236 The court, however, declined to pass on the question of
whether a bank's misrepresentation of certain other bank activities might
constitute a deceptive act relating to a sale of "services. '"237 Although the
court ruled that the DTPA claim failed, the court upheld the fraud claim
and remanded the case to the court of civil appeals for a determination as
to whether the evidence supported an award of exemplary damages.
238
While the supreme court emphasized that the statutory provisions that
governed the case were those in effect at the time of the alleged deceptive
acts, 2 3 9 it does not seem that the definition of "consumer" was amended in
such a way that the result in this case would be different under the present
version of the DTPA. 24°
Wrongful Dishonor Is Within the DTPA. Almost as if on cue, in a case
decided shortly after Riverside, a court of civil appeals found that a bank
that had wrongfully dishonored a series of its customer's checks was liable
under the DTPA.241 The court distinguished Riverside on the ground that
the depositor in the case at bar had acquired bank checking account serv-
ices in return for payment of a monthly fee and thus qualified as a "con-
sumer." 242 The court said: "The facts in the instant case seem to fit
squarely within the question reserved by the Supreme Court in footnote 5
because the deliberate dishonoring of checks, a wrongful performance of a
routine bank service, is the specific complaint. '243 The court awarded
235. Id. at 173-74.
236. Id. at 174-75. The definition of "consumer" relied on by the court appears in note
233 supra.
237. 603 S.W.2d at 175 n.5. The language of the opinion indicates that the DTPA action
might have been sustained had the plaintiff alleged that he sought specific services besides
the use of money, and had he complained about the quality of the bank's collateral activi-
ties. Id. at 175.
238. Id. at 177. On remand, the award of exemplary damages was upheld. 605 S.W.2d
954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1980, no writ).
239. 603 S.W.2d at 172.
240. The definition of "consumer" now provides: " 'Consumer' means an individual,
partnership, corporation, or governmental entity who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease,
any goods or services." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981). The court concentrated on the issue of whether plaintiff sought "goods" and "serv-
ices" as stated in the former definition of "consumer." 603 S.W.2d at 172-76. Compare the
current definition with the earlier definition set out in note 233 supra.
241. Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 605 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1980, writ granted).
242. Id. at 324.
243. Id. The "footnote 5" referred to is a footnote by the Texas Supreme Court in Riper-
side. See note 237 supra and accompanying text.
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treble damages for the wrongful dishonors.244
E. Banking Legislation
DIDMCA. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980245 became effective in March 1980. While the Act deals
with a wide range of topics, those of particular interest in the area of com-
mercial law are the provisions that permit increased competition between
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions in two
major areas: personal checking accounts and personal loans. First, the
Act authorizes all three types of financial institutions to offer checking ac-
count services, 246 although savings and loan associations and credit unions
are prevented from offering business checking accounts, and must limit
their services to personal or nonprofit accounts. 247 As a new feature under
the Act, any of the three types of financial institutions may pay interest on
checking accounts.248
Because the cost of offering interest-bearing checking accounts is still
unknown, many financial institutions may begin using a "truncated" sys-
tem for processing checks.249 Under a truncated system, the customer
would write his or her check on a form that contains duplicate pages,
somewhat like a credit card form. The negotiable original would be given
to the payee to serve as the check while the carbon copy (which probably
should be pre-printed in such a way that negotiability is destroyed) would
be retained by the customer to serve as a record of the transaction. The
original would be handled by the payee like any other check and would be
forwarded for collection through the appropriate clearing system. 250 Upon
receipt by the drawee the standard process of posting would occur,25' but
the cancelled checks would not be returned to the customer. Instead, the
drawee would retain the checks and send a summary statement of transac-
244. Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 605 S.W.2d 320, 327 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ granted).
245. Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 101-902, 94 Stat. 132-93 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 12, 15, 22 U.S.C.). The acronym is pronounced "did'h-mac."
246. Id. §§ 302-305, 94 Stat. 145-47. The particular effective dates for these portions of
the Act were Mar. 31, 1980, for §§ 302, 304, 305 and Dec. 31, 1980, for § 303. Id. § 306, 94
Stat. 147. For savings and loans and credit unions the Act uses the term "negotiable order of
withdrawal" (NOW) accounts, but such an instrument is functionally identical to a check.
For simplicity, the term "check" is used in the discussion of these accounts.
247. Id. §§ 303, 305(d), 94 Stat. 146-47.
248. Id. §§ 302-305, 94 Stat. 145-47.
249. Such a system is currently in use at the Texins Credit Union for employees of Texas
Instruments, Inc.
250. There may be a choice of clearing systems available for any particular item. The
Act contemplates clearings through local clearing house associations, the Federal Reserve,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or the Central Liquidity Facility, a new agency estab-
lished by § 309 of the Act. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 309, 94 Stat. 146-47 (1980). The choice will
probably depend on which system(s) the drawee has joined as well as the judgment of the
depository bank (the first bank in the collection chain, see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.105(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)) as to the fastest method of clearing the item (or the
slowest if "float" is of concern).
251. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.109 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) for a
description of such a process.
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tions during a given time period to the customer. Such a system would
save a considerable amount of processing time and cost. If the need arose,
the customer, of course, could obtain a verified copy of the original from
the drawee. The system is fully compatible with the Code.252
The second major area of new competition will be the entry of savings
and loan associations into the consumer lending market. Credit unions
and commercial banks, of course, have long been competing in this area.
Two primary limitations under the Act will affect the ability of savings and
loans to compete for consumer loan business. First, no more than twenty
percent of the assets of a savings and loan association may be outstanding
on consumer loans at any one time. 253 Secondly, the associations are lim-
ited to making loans for "personal, family or household purposes," a qual-
ification that parallels the definition of "consumer goods" under the
Code.254 The similarity of the definitions, however, should not lead one to
think that only those loans that are secured by consumer goods may be
made under the Act; any type of collateral may be used to secure the loan.
Thus, a person could pledge shares of stock ("instruments" under the Code
definitions) 255 as collateral to secure funds for the payment of family medi-
cal expenses. Because chapter 9 of the Code is a general personal property
security statute,256 the major impact of the new federal legislation in the
consumer lending area will be to require savings and loan associations to
become familiar with a statutory area they rarely have confronted before.
Chapter 9 is not directly affected by the legislation.
Electronic Funds Transfers (EFT). Voter approval last November of the
Texas constitutional amendment to permit the use of automatic teller ma-
chines 257 will create new litigation in the commercial law area regarding
the transfer of funds by electronic means. Implementing legislation was
approved during the last legislative session, to become effective if the
amendment was approved. 258 This legislation specifically provides that
the Electronic Fund Transfers Act,2 59 passed by Congress in 1978, will
provide the initial regulatory base for the use of such machines, subject to
continuing study of the effectiveness of that act by the Texas State Banking
Board and the Texas Attorney General, with periodic reports to the legis-
lature on whether state regulation is needed. 260
252. See, e.g., id. §§ 4.104(a)(7), .401, .406.
253. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401, 94 Stat. 151-55 (1980).
254. Id. For the definition of "consumer goods," see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.109(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
255. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(9) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
256. Id. §§ 9.101-.507. On the general nature of ch. 9, see id. § 9.102.
257. The amendment was Proposition One on the November ballot. The full text of the
amendment appears in 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, at
3222.
258. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
259. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of the Electronic Fund Trans-
fers Act, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, § 16-9, at 640-46.





A. Validity of Security Agreement
After-Acquired Interest in Consumer Goods. In Brown v. U. S Life Credit
Corp. 261 a secured party included an after-acquired property clause in a
security agreement covering consumer goods. The ten-day limitation on
the effectiveness of such a clause imposed by section 9.204 of the Code262
was not disclosed to the debtor. The court held that the failure to make
disclosure of the ten-day limitation was a violation of the Truth In Lend-
ing Act 263 that subjected the creditor to the penalty provisions within that
Act. 264 The debtor successfully asserted the violation of the Act as a coun-
terclaim in the secured party's suit on the secured note even though the
one-year statute of limitations had run.265 The counterclaim was allowed
because the court viewed it as in the nature of a recoupment and not an
independent action.266 This analysis of the statute of limitations is consis-
tent with other Texas cases applying the Truth In Lending Act.267
B. Priorities in Secured Collateral
Lien Creditor Versus Secured Party. Under section 9.301 of the Code, an
unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who
becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected. 268 Even if
the security interest is perfected, the lien creditor has some protection
against future advances made by the secured party more than forty-five
days after the lien attaches.2 69 In Fondren Southwest Bank v. Marathon
LeTourneau Co. 270 the court held that a secured party who had obtained a
security agreement and filed a financing statement was nonetheless
subordinate to a lien creditor who later obtained a lien on the collateral
because the secured party (who would have the theoretical first priority)
had failed to show the amount of any indebtedness underlying the security
261. 602 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
262. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.204(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
In part the section provides: "No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property
clause to consumer goods ... unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after
the secured party gives value."
263. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1639(a)(8) (1976). The Act has been amended recently by Pub.
L. No. 96-221, §§ 601-625, 94 Stat. 168-86 (1980). See note 245 supra.
264. 602 S.W.2d at 97-98. The court cited 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980), which
imposes a penalty equal to twice the amount of the finance charge involved in the transac-
tion.
265. 602 S.W.2d at 96. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976) imposes a one-year limitation on suits
brought to recover for violations of the Act.
266. 602 S.W.2d at 96.
267. See, e.g., Garza v. Allied Fin. Co., 566 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Civ. App.--Cous Christi
1978, no writ); Christian v. First Nat'l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1975, writ retd n.r.e.).
268. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
269. Id. § 9.301(d).
270. 598 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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agreement. 27' The court quite properly noted that section 9.203272 re-
quires the secured party to give value to create and attach a valid security
interest and, that in the absence of proof of value, a theoretical first prior-
ity position will fail. 27 3 The secured party also failed to show any ad-
vances made to the debtor before or within forty-five days after the lien
arose as provided under the exceptions contained in section 9.301(d).274
In another lien creditor case 2 7 5 the court properly held that a receiver for
the benefit of creditors qualified as a lien creditor under the definitions of
the Code276 and had priority under section 9.301 against the claim of an
unperfected secured party. 277
Conflicting Claims to Proceeds. In Grandview Farm Center, Inc. v. First
State Bank 278 the court held that, even though a secured party had filed in
the wrong place, the filing was made in good faith and would be effective
to protect an interest in proceeds as against a person who had knowledge
of the existing security interest.279 This decision was reached under the
"good faith filing error" provision of the Code.280
271. Id. at 338.
272. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-198 1).
273. 598 S.W.2d at 338.
274. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.30 1(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
275. Empire Life & Hosp. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 595 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, no writ).
276. Id. at 905 n.l. The definition may be found at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.301(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
277. Empire Life & Hosp. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 595 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1980, no writ). The section referred to is TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(a)(2)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). See text accompanying note 268 supra.
278. 596 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
279. Id. at 192-93.
280. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.401(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
That section provides:
A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in all of the
places required by this section is nevertheless effective with regard to any col-
lateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements of this chapter
and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by the financing state-
ment against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing
statement.
Courts have split on whether mere knowledge of a security interest will validate an im-
proper filing or whether actual knowledge of the contents of the improperly filed financing
statement is required. Compare Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Bank of Wiggins, 358 So. 2d 714
(Miss. 1978) (knowledge of security interest sufficient) with In re County Green Ltd., 438 F.
Supp. 693 (W.D. Va. 1977) (knowledge of contents of financing statement required). Ac-
cording to the court in Grandview, Texas has adopted the view that mere knowledge of a
security interest will validate an improper filing. 596 S.W.2d at 193. Although the cases
cited by the court do support this proposition, they fail to discuss the knowledge of contents
requirement. See Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 133 (Tex. 1974); McGehee v.
Exchange Bank & Trust Co., 561 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Van Shaw, 476 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1972, no writ). The Texas Supreme Court in Meadows did not make the knowledge of
contents distinction, but cited J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 114, § 21-3, at 832, who
seem to favor the view that knowledge of the contents of an improperly filed financing state-
ment is required for validation. Moreover, comment 5 to § 9.401 of the Code clearly re-
quires knowledge of the contents of the financing statement. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
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One of the most complex issues in the proceeds area is the right of a
secured party to claim the proceeds of collateral that are commingled in a
debtor's bank account prior to the debtor's bankruptcy. In In re Cooper28'
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas
held that section 9.306(d)(4)(B)282 of the Code operates to cut off any com-
mon law tracing right on the part of the secured party and substitutes a
statutory formula for asserting a proceeds interest in an insolvent debtor's
commingled bank account. The court further held that the secured party
failed to qualify for protection under the statutory formula because the
debtor received none of the proceeds during the ten-day period prior to
institution of insolvency proceedings as required by the statute.283
Priorities in Accessions. In the first Texas case on the subject of accessions
that interprets section 9.314 of the Code,284 a court of civil appeals held
that the purchase money security interest of an accession claimant had pri-
ority over the claim of a subsequent purchaser for value who asserted an
interest in the collateral as a whole. 285 The court reached this decision on
two grounds. First, because the goods involved were easily identified and
readily removable, the court found that they did not become a part of the
whole by accession.2 86 Secondly, even if the goods were accessions, the
court ruled that the accession claimant's interest prevailed because it had
been perfected prior to the subsequent purchase as provided in section
9.314.287 The ruling of the court on the second ground required a careful
examination of section 9.314 as adopted in Texas because of an apparent
printing error that caused an arguably different meaning in the Texas
Code as compared to the official text of the Uniform Commercial Code. 28 8
The court concluded that the Texas Code should be read to have the same
meaning as the Uniform Commercial Code. 289
Priorities in the Context of Default. As all lawyers know, there are some
cases that sound like law school examination questions. Food City, Inc. v.
§ 9.401, comment 5 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Thus, an obvious conflict re-
mains.
281. 2 B.R. 188 (Bankr. Ct. S.D. Tex. 1980).
282. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(d)(4)(B) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981). An excellent Article dealing with the complexities of this Code provision is Skilton,
The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account under Section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 60.
283. 2 B.R. at 196.
284. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
285. IDS Leasing Corp. v. Leasing Assocs., Inc., 590 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
286. Id. at 609.
287. Id. at 609-11.
288. Id. The sections involved were TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.314(c)(3) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-81) and U.C.C. § 9-314(3)(c) (1978 version).
289. 590 S.W.2d at 611. Thus, a party claiming exception to the accession interest rule of
§ 9.314(a) must demonstrate not only that he was a subsequent purchaser for value, that he
obtained a lien through judicial proceedings, or that he made subsequent advances under a
prior perfected security interest, but also that he did so without knowledge of another secur-
ity interest and before such interest was perfected. Id. at 610-11.
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Fleming Companies, Inc. 290 is one such case. In Food City secured party
number one took and properly perfected a security interest in the equip-
ment, fixtures, inventory, contract rights, and accounts of the debtor, a gro-
cery store. Sometime thereafter, the debtor borrowed money from secured
party number two, which took a security interest in equipment and
fixtures, but this interest was never perfected. Upon default under the first
security interest, secured party number one took steps to foreclose its se-
curity interest and ultimately entered into an agreement with the debtor
for the foreclosure. Shortly after the foreclosure took place, secured party
number two notified the debtor and the first secured party that it was fore-
closing on its security interest because of default on its own agreement.
Secured party number two then purported to purchase, for the unpaid bal-
ance of the debtor's note, the equipment and fixtures at a foreclosure sale
that it conducted in the parking lot at the store. Thereafter, secured party
number two sued secured party number one demanding possession of the
equipment and fixtures.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact and resolved the issues of
good faith, commercial reasonableness, and notice in favor of secured
party number one. The legal issues of whether the first foreclosure caused
the second security interest to move to a first priority position or whether
the first foreclosure operated to extinguish the second security interest also
were resolved in favor of secured party number one.
On appeal, in a lengthy and careful opinion, the court affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court.29' Although the opinion is generally a good one,
the court should have addressed more comprehensively the question of
whether a secured party who retains collateral in satisfaction of a debt, or
who buys collateral at a foreclosure sale, can extinguish a subordinate se-
curity interest. The court held that this result would obtain under either
fact situation but failed fully to explain its reasoning.292
C. Proceedings After Default
Debtor's Remedies for Improper Disposition. Two reported cases involved
pure default situations and present contrasting approaches to the question
of whether a debtor can recover damages for allegedly improper acts com-
mitted in the course of the disposition of collateral. In Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Garcia293 the debtor sued the secured party for wrongful reposses-
sion of the debtor's truck under section 9.503 of the Code. 294 On appeal
from a judgment for the debtor, the court held that the debtor's pleading
290. 590 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
291. Id. at 762.
292. Id. at 758. The issues involved are difficult ones and a textual analysis of the statute
does little to resolve them. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504(a), (d), .505(b) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Some of the problems are discussed in B. CLARK, supra
note 8, 4.9.
293. 595 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
294. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). The
debtor alleged that the repossession involved a breach of the peace.
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under "wrongful repossession," and not under "conversion," limited the
debtor's right of recovery to the amount of the debtor's equity in the repos-
sessed vehicle. 295 Section 9.507 of the Code,296 providing penalty recov-
eries for the debtor if the secured party fails to follow Code procedures,
was not mentioned nor, apparently, raised. In Garza v. Brazos County Fed-
eral Credit Union 297 the secured party sued to recover a deficiency result-
ing from the sale of collateral, and the debtor sought to offset the
deficiency by using the penalty provisions of section 9.507. The court
agreed that the secured party had proceeded improperly in its disposition
of the collateral and allowed the offset. 298 Garza obviously represents the
better approach for a debtor seeking recovery for improper disposition of
collateral.
Foreclosure by Garnishment and Sequestration. New rules of civil proce-
dure for garnishment and sequestration 299 have been adopted by the Texas
Supreme Court to conform these procedures to the due process require-
ments of Fuentes v. Shevin, 3°° Mitchell v. WT Grant Co. ,301 and North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 302
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
Letter of Credit as Taxable Income. In Watson v. Commissioner30 3 the
Fifth Circuit held that a farmer who sold cotton and received a letter of
credit that expressly deferred payment under the credit until the following
year was liable for the payment of income taxes on the value of the credit
upon receipt of the credit rather than upon payment of the credit at a later
time.3°4 The court reasoned that, because the credit was irrevocable, the
taxpayer's rights in the credit had become fixed under the Texas Business
and Commerce Code.30 5 Furthermore, even though the credit itself was
not designated as assignable on its face, the court noted that section
5.116(b) of the Code306 permits a beneficiary to assign the right to proceeds
295. 595 S.W.2d at 605.
296. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.507 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
297. 603 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
298. Id. at 300-01.
299. TEX. R. Civ. P. 717-734 (effective Jan. 1, 1981).
300. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin statutes that fail to provide notice or hearing prior to
deprivation of property are unconstitutional).
301. 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (seizure of property without prior hearing upheld because judi-
cial control of process was maintained from beginning to end; Fuentes v. Shevin distin-
guished).
302. 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment statute unconstitutional for failing to provide no-
tice, hearing, or judicial control over the process; corporations entitled to procedural safe-
guards as well as individual consumers).
303. 613 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980).
304. Id. at 599.
305. Id. at 598; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.106(a)(2), (b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
306. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.116(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (beneficiary




under such a credit.30 7 Because the right to receive proceeds under the
credit had a present value to the taxpayer, the court held that the amount
of that value constituted taxable income for the year in which the letter of
credit was received. 30 8
Uncert#ficated Securities Under Chapter 8. In 1978 the permanent editorial
board for the Uniform Commercial Code promulgated a revision of article
8 of the official text of the Code to provide a statutory base for the use of
"uncertificated securities. '' 3° 9 An "uncertificated security" is not repre-
sented by a stock certificate; ownership is reflected, instead, by registration
on the books of the issuer or transfer agent. The purpose of such securities
is to simplify transfer and to avoid the increasing delays attending the
physical exchange of stock certificates through brokers and securities mar-
kets.310 Three states have adopted the revision of article 8,3 11 and the revi-
sion probably will be considered by the Sixty-seventh Texas Legislature.
307. 613 F.2d at 598.
308. Id. at 599.
309. U.C.C. § 8-101 (1978 version). For a discussion of the details of the revision, see
Special Project: Uncerticated Securities, Articles 8 and 9 of the U. C C, and the Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act: A New System to Accommodate Modern Securities Transactions, 11
TEx. TECH L. REV. 813 (1980). The Article includes the full text of the article 8 revision. A
limited number of reprints of the Article are available and, within the limits of availability,
the author of this Survey Article will be happy to supply copies upon request to persons
interested in the article 8 revision.
310. The orderly functioning of the securities markets has been threatened by the
"paperwork crunch" caused by an increasing volume of share transfers. See AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STOCK CERTIFICATES, SECTION OF
CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 1 (1975).
311. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42a-8-101 to -406 (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 336.8-101 to -408 (West Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE §§ 46-8-102 to -408 (Cum. Supp.
1980).
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